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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860326 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts are 
set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages one through four. The 
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply the Points II and III of 
Respondent's Brief. 
POINT I. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point III) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
In his opening brief, Mr. Griffiths argued that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error by not giving one of his proposed 
eyewitness identification jury instructions. Mr. Griffiths relied 
primarily on this Court's decision in State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 
(Utah 1986). 
In its response brief, the State contended that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give any of the 
requested instructions. The State relied on the pre State v. Long, 
721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) cases and in reaching its conclusion that 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. While the State is 
correct in its assertion that Long does not control the instant 
case, the conclusion that the Court did not abuse its discretion is 
incorrect. 
This Court set the applicable pre-Long standards in two 
recent cases, State v. Jonas, supra and State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18 (March 26, 1987). The pre-Long standard is as follows: 
"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a 
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness 
identification instruction . . . was given, 
[citations omitted] However, this Court also 
stated prior to Long that the failure to give an 
eyewitness instruction might be an abuse of 
discretion where there were serious questions 
about the reliability of the eyewitness 
identificatione [citations omitted] (emphasis 
added). 
State v. Quevedo, supra at 2. 
In State v. Jonas, supra, this Court held for the first 
time that a trial judge had abused his discreiton in failing to give 
a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction. In Jonas, 
serious questions as to the reliability of the identification arose 
where: (1) the victim had little opportunity to observe his 
assailant; (2) the witness initially described his assailant as 
clean-shaven, but later changed his description to include a 
mustache; (3) the witness described an assailant with a crooked nose 
yet selected a photo of the Appellant who did not have a crooked 
nose; (4) the victim's trial testimony showed that he was uncertain 
and hesitant in the way in which he selected the defendant during 
the photo array; and, (5) there were no other witnesses or 
corroborating evidence. 
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In State v. QuevedO/ supra, this Court did not find serious 
questions as to the reliability of the eyewitness identification and 
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing 
to give a cautionary instruction. In Quevedo, four police officers, 
trained in making such identifications, positively identified the 
defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing a robbery 
scene. Furthermore, one of the officers had known the defendant for 
three years. The officers located Quevedo in a nearby apartment 
shortly after the fleeing getaway car crashed. An occupant of the 
apartment stated, "I don't know what he done, he just ran in here." 
At the time of his arrest Quevedo wore the same jacket that the 
fleeing driver had worn. 
The identifications in the instant case are subject to the 
same serious concerns as to their reliablity as was the 
identification in Jonas. The witnesses in the instant case gave 
differing descriptions of their assailant concerning whether or not 
he had a full moustache. 
At the police line-up held on February 4, 1986, Mr. Smith 
and Mr. Herbert were unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as their 
assailant (T. 39, 153). Ms. Herbert positively identified a member 
of the line-up other than Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (T. 138). The 
witnesses at Rocky Mountain Video described their assailant as 
having a slight moustache, yet Dr. Smith testified that on January 
6, 1986, Mr. Griffiths has a "very exaggerated moustache" (T. 8). 
The prosecutor in this case was so concerned about the 
identification by the victims of this robbery that he took the 
unusual step of calling Ms. Silcox to testify concerning Mr. 
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Griffiths1 appearance in December (See Appellant's Brief Point III., 
p. 15-17). The prosecutor stated, "Judge, as you know, there are a 
number of other cases and identification in appearance becomes very 
critical" (Te 19). The prosecutor went on to state, "He's changed 
his appearance so dramatically, Judge, as you've heard, three of 
these witnesses could not pick him out at the line-up. And so the 
alteration of appearance becomes absolutely critical to me. . ." (T. 
21). Thus even the prosecutor in this case admitted that eyewitness 
identification was crucial to this case. 
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980) this Court 
stated that: "Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on 
his theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to 
support that theory". In this case the defense theory was a faulty 
eye-witness identification. This theory is supported by the 
inability of the witnesses to identify Mr. Griffiths at the line-up 
and the prosecutor's admission that "identification in appearance 
becomes very critical" (T. 19). 
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious 
doubts as to the identification of Mr. Griffiths as the gunman did 
not exist in this case. There was no physical evidence that placed 
Mr. Griffiths in the video store. Mr. Mouritsen testified that he 
heard "something that sounded like a shot and then saw a man running 
diagonally across the street limping seriously" (T. 102-03). 
However, Mouritsen was not able to identify the person he saw 
running down the street. 
A careful review of the facts in this case establishes that 
they are aligned with those in Jonas. Three of the witnesses to the 
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robbery were not able to identify Mr. Griffiths from a police 
line-up. Furthermore, the prosecutor in the case was so concerned 
with the identification issue that he called Ms. Silcox, a victim of 
another robbery, to testify concerning Mr. Griffiths' appearance at 
the time of the robbery. The remaining evidence presented by the 
State failed to corroborate the identification so as to overcome the 
serious doubts that Mr. Griffiths was the man who robbed Rocky 
Mountain Video. Because of this, the trial judge abused his 
discretion in failing to give the requested cautionary 
identification instruction. 
POINT II. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SINCE 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY 
MR. GRIFFITHS TO THE POLICE BEFORE TRIAL. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Griffiths argued that the trial 
court committed reversible error in denying his motion for a 
mistrial where the prosecutor failed to provide defense counsel with 
statements allegedly made by Mr. Griffiths to Detective Ron Edwards 
shortly after his arrest on the charge in the present case. Mr. 
Griffiths relied principally on State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 
1975) and State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
In its response, the State contended that reversal of the 
conviction is not warranted since there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the prosecutor's failure to disclose the evidence to 
defense counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been more 
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favorable to Mr. Griffiths. The state focused primarily on State v. 
Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, P.2d (Utah 1987) which this 
court decided after Mr. Griffiths filed his brief. 
In State v. Knight, supra, this court reversed a conviction 
for aggravated robbery where the prosecutor failed to provide the 
defense with inculpatory evidence comprised of the current addresses 
and phone numbers of two witnesses and statements made by such 
witnesses which tended to refute the defendant's alibi defense. In 
Knight, this Court acknowledges that: 
When . . . the error consists of the 
prosecution's failure to provide a defendant with 
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide 
much assistance in discovering the nature or 
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the 
defendant. 
State v. Knight, supra at 17. 
Because the reviewing Court is left to speculate as to the 
possible effect on the outcome caused by the state's wrongful 
failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, "it seems appropriate in 
such instances to place the burden on the state to persuade a court 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense. Therefore, 
when the defendant can make a credible argument that the 
prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the state 
to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more 
favorable for the defendant." State v. Knight, supra at 17. 
The State's failure to disclose the inculpatory evidence 
impaired Mr. Griffith's defense by damaging defense counsel's 
ability to formulate a pretrial strategy and adequately prepare for 
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trial*1 Because the state did not inform defense counsel of the 
statements, counsel did not question his client, his own witness or 
Detective Edwards as to the details of such statements prior to 
trial. He did not focus on the statements in deciding whether to 
use Ms. Newsome as a witness. As the state speculates in its brief, 
"(p)erhaps he would have reconsidered using Newsome as an alibi 
witness, had he known that the state would present his post-arrest 
statements". Respondent's Brief at 13. The state then points out 
that "on the other hand" defense counsel "may well have chosen to 
take his chances with Newsome". Respondent's Brief at 14. 
Regardless of whether defense counsel ultimately decided to use 
Newsome as a witness, the state's failure to provide defendant with 
:he statements denied counsel an opportunity to adequately 
Investigate such statements and make an informed decision as to 
/hether to use Ms. Newsome as an alibi witness. 
In addition, defense counsel was unable to adequately 
prepare to meet and refute such statements. The statements were 
introduced by the prosecution as rebuttal to a witness the defense 
had determined was important enough to put on the stand as part of 
its case. Had the statements been disclosed, defense counsel may 
1
 The State concedes in its brief that the prosecutor did not fully 
comply with the discovery order (Respondent's Brief at 11). In 
State v. Knight, supra, the defense sought to discover material not 
specifically mentioned in Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16, 1953 as amended). In the instant case, 
the inculpatory evidence consisted of statements allegedly made by 
the defendant. Such evidence is specifically mentioned in Rule 
16(a)(2) and is not the type evidence which would have led a 
prosecutor to believe that he did not have a duty to disclose. 
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have been able to refute such statements or otherwise dispel their 
impact by information learned from questioning the defendant, Ms. 
Newsome and Detective Edwards as part of his pretrial preparation. 
Since the state's failure to disclose the statements 
impaired Mr. Griffith's defense, the State has the burden of proving 
that the error was not prejudicial. See State v. Knight, supra at 
18. To meet this burden, the State must show that "despite the 
errors, the outcome of the trial merits confidence and there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant." 
State v. Knight, supra at 18. 
The state fails in its argument to specifically point out 
what facts and circumstances it relies on in this case to sustain 
its burden of proof. Instead, the state makes the unsupported 
statement "the circumstances of defendant's case, which are outlined 
above, persuasively establish that the error did not unfairly 
prejudice the defense." Respondent's Brief at 14. 
As Mr. Griffiths argued in Point I of his brief, this case 
involved considerable uncertainty as to the identification of Mr. 
Griffiths as the perpetrator of the robbery. Only one out of four 
witnesses was able to pick Mr. Griffiths out of a lineup. Pretrial 
strategy and preparation in deciding whether to use Ms. Newsome as a 
witness or how to refute Detective Edwards testimony were critical 
in this case. As this Court pointed out in Knight, neither the 
Court nor the state could presume that Georgie Moore's testimony was 
correct. Similarly in this case, neither the Court nor State can 
presume that Detective Edwards' testimony was true. 
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Given the circumstances of this case and the statefs 
failure to provide any support for its contention that the defendant 
was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure, the State has failed to 
sustain its burden of proving that the outcome of the trial was 
unaffected by the State's nondisclosure of the inclupatory 
evidence. This Court cannot presume under the circumstances of this 
case that the outcome was unaffected and the conviction should 
therefore be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Jerry 
Dee Griffiths, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand 
his case to the District Court for either dismissal or a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, this // day of June, 1987. 
I^NN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this // day of June, 1987. 
J^ TNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED by this day of 
June, 1987. 
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